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Was There Something Unique to the Japanese That Lost Them
the Battle of Midway?

James P. Levy

We military historians have a tendency to obsess over the causes of victory and
defeat in war. Like economists, we have a profound desire to identify those actions that ensure success or generate failure, and like economists we are not
overly good at it. At best, we can state the obvious, as when the disparity of forces
between two opponents is extreme, or ascertain certain verities, like “It is good
to have the better trained troops,” or “Keep your troops better equipped, fed, and
rested than your opponent’s.” At worst, this obsession with winning and losing
can lead to a lot of shameless Monday-morning quarterbacking and counterfactual historical speculation.
The battle of Midway is a prime example of this profound desire to identify
such causes and, as its usual concomitant, to attribute blame for defeat. The victory of the U.S. Navy over the Imperial Japanese Navy on 4 June 1942 was both
clear and unexpected. Since by many criteria the Japanese fleet was both qualitatively and quantitatively superior to its U.S. counterpart, historians have felt a
great need to explain the outcome of the battle. One of the most popular books on
the subject describes the victory as a “miracle,” and this quasi-supernatural hint
at an explanation lies close to the surface of many popular accounts of the battle
of Midway.1 Americans are, like everyone else, often quite content to believe that
God is on their side.
However, let us put aside popular perception
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ciety and an independent scholar living in the Berk- the outcome of the battle. Many explanations
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have been proffered. Paul Dull finds the key to
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the outcome of the battle in what he perceives as
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the adoption by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and his planning staff of a bestcase scenario. He cannot understand why Yamamoto did not assume that the
Americans would be exactly where they were on the morning of 4 June—a
claim I find baffling.2 Such an assumption would have required not genius but
clairvoyance. Ronald Spector quotes Admiral Matome Ugaki’s famous lament
that the Japanese had been too “conceited,” but this is surely more an excuse
on Ugaki’s part than an explanation of what happened.3 Douglas Smith sees
the root cause of Japanese failure in Admiral Chūichi Nagumo’s “arrogance and
intransigence”; H. P. Willmott accuses the Japanese of suffering from “victory
disease,” an ailment whose symptoms he describes as “illusion,” “confusion,” and
“self-deception.”4 Harry Gailey is a bit vague in his attribution of blame but does
point to Nagumo’s decisions as “contributing” to Japan’s defeat, and he describes
Yamamoto’s plan as “complex” and “grandiose.”5 A recurring assumption about
the battle appears to be that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the
Americans did to win it, or more.
The latest and in many ways most complete account of the battle is Parshall and
Tully’s Shattered Sword (2005).6 While a work of fine research and well informed
analysis, it is obsessed with debunking perceived “myths” about the battle, shooting down Mitsuo Fuchida’s account of the battle in particular, and demonstrating
the faults the authors believe existed in Japanese practice and doctrine. Parshall
and Tully lay on blame with a trowel. Minoru Genda’s plan, they maintain, was
flawed; Nagumo was rigid and uninspired, lacking a firm grasp of the technical
intricacies of his carrier force; while Yamamoto is portrayed as simply inept. In
their efforts Parshall and Tully throw around some pretty robust anthropological
assertions. Nagumo was not just personally a drone but the product of a culture
that “valued conformity and obedience over creativity or personal initiative.”7 In
direct contradiction to this claim, it would appear that Yamamoto and his staff
(and Admiral Toyoda later in the war) were too creative, dreaming up intricate
“monstrosities” in their febrile Asiatic heads. The authors go even farther, saying,
“It is clear that in this regard that Japanese naval strategy was influenced from its
very inception by Oriental philosophies on the conduct of war.”8 Leaving aside
the fact that no one uses the term “oriental” anymore, it is hard to reconcile the
belief that a society can both be wedded to “conformity and obedience over creativity and personal initiative” and still be the heir of Sun Tzu. Be that as it may,
in the end Parshall and Tully simply opine that Japanese strategy was “warped.”
Well, perhaps it was warped. Perhaps the Japanese were conceited, arrogant,
confused, grandiose, inept, rigid, and taken in by what must be wrongheaded
“Oriental philosophies on the conduct of war” that undermined their professional judgment. Yet maybe, just maybe, the Japanese did not lose the battle. Perhaps
the Americans, who were very good and very lucky, won it, which leads me to ask
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/9
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whether any such explanations and approbation as historians have meted out are
needed to understand what the Japanese were doing during Operation Mi—their
campaign to capture Midway and defeat the American fleet. I do not believe we
do need them. The plan to use an assault on Midway to provoke a fleet engagement was not at all foolish. Japan still enjoyed a marked superiority over the U.S.
Navy in the Pacific. To surrender the initiative would have been dangerous and
demoralizing. To wait around for the Americans to shift the carriers Wasp and
Ranger to the Pacific and repair Saratoga would have been unconscionable, and
to give them a chance to bring the fruits of the Naval Act of 1938 (the Second
Vinson Act) off the slipways and into battle would have been suicidal. So in the
spring of 1942, it was imperative to attack the Americans as soon as possible.
By examining the details of the battle, one can argue that certain actions for
which the Japanese have been chastised were in no way bizarre or patently incorrect. Dividing the fleet into several dispersed subunits was not reckless or bizarre,
and in fact the decision to disperse the fleet was unavoidable, for three reasons.
First, the Imperial Japanese Navy was in 1942, like all other major navies, a hybrid
force of older, slower ships and newer, faster ones. The carrier force could not
be and should not have been combined with the battle fleet. The Americans did
not combine fleets in 1942, and neither should have the Japanese. The surviving
battlewagons of Pearl Harbor were never shackled like a ball and chain to the fast
carrier task forces. This reality also applies to using the carriers Junyo and Ryuho
with the fast carriers of Nagumo’s Kido Butai—they were too slow. Second, the
Midway operations involved both a convoy escort and an invasion force, as would
the U.S. operations against both Tarawa and Guam, to give two examples. This
meant the necessary division of the force into a carrier group, a covering group,
and a landing group, at least. Third, given the vast expanse of the Pacific and the
desire to grapple with the enemy, it was inevitable that forces would be dispersed
to increase their chances of finding and engaging the American fleet. An overly
compact disposition would have left too much of the ocean uncovered and given
the Americans more room both to maneuver and to escape.
Only a dogmatic, Tinkertoy, popularized version of Mahan insists on a
complete and permanent concentration of a fleet. 9 One can as easily invoke
the history of the Royal Navy, which the Japanese knew well, and the theories
of Sir Julian Corbett, as any attachment to esoteric Asian military theory to
understand why the Japanese might disperse their forces to coax an inferior
enemy to battle.10 For the Royal Navy, a key strategic problem had historically
been how to entice recalcitrant enemies like Spain, France, Italy, and Germany
to come out and fight. Anyone with a cursory knowledge of the campaign of
Trafalgar would know that the Royal Navy was never averse to dividing the
fleet to increase the chance of intercepting and engaging the enemy. The British
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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had divided their forces strategically between Admiral Sir William Cornwallis
in the English Channel and Admiral Lord Nelson off Cádiz to keep the enemy
fleet divided. Nelson then tactically divided his fleet in the face of a numerically superior enemy the better to crush the Franco-Spanish fleet between two
fires at Trafalgar. Jutland, the most studied battle of the interwar period, was a
stark example of the problem of a massed fleet forcing an enemy to fight when
that enemy knew he was outnumbered. On 31 May 1916 both Admirals John
Jellicoe and Reinhard Scheer divided their fleets in the hope of drawing part of
the enemy fleet into a tactical trap. Once Scheer fully comprehended that the
Grand Fleet was out, he successfully ran for home, leaving a rigidly united British
fleet to deal rather poorly with his evasions.
As for Yamamoto, since forcing an engagement was his primary objective,
he was going to have to take some risks to bring it about. Dividing his fleet into
dispersed subunits was just such a risk. The British had run similar risks in their
naval war in the Mediterranean during the period 1940–42.11 That the Americans would respond more aggressively than Britain’s historical adversaries was
something on which the Japanese were counting. Nevertheless, if the Americans
discovered the entire Imperial Japanese Navy in one tight formation, they might
easily have balked at the odds. Again, the Japanese wanted to fight a battle but
were concerned that the Americans might not oblige. The Japanese, however,
were not aware that the Americans knew of their plans and had responded preemptively with characteristic aggressiveness. Thus American diligence, not Japanese arrogance or incompetence, was the deciding factor.
This brings us to the issue of the conceit, arrogance, or overconfidence of the
Japanese as crucial to explaining their failure at Midway. We have seen that this
theme appears in the work of such capable authors as Ronald Spector and H.
P. Willmott. Yet I would argue that these terms are meaningless as descriptors
of causal agency. Any perusal of history will show that successful commanders
from Julius Caesar to George Patton, from Alexander of Macedon to Nelson of
Trafalgar, displayed personality traits that could by any definition be construed as
conceited and confident in the extreme. Overconfidence, or excessive arrogance,
is an ex post facto judgment, not an identifiable trait that can be disassociated
from the knowledge that a confident or arrogant person has failed. If the Duke of
Wellington had lost Waterloo or Robert E. Lee Chancellorsville, you can bet your
bottom dollar that they would have been pilloried by historians after the fact as
having shown conceit and overconfidence. If you need to know the results of an
action to hand down a verdict of “overconfident,” one can legitimately contend
that the term has no explanatory power.
Given this assessment, there is not much that the Japanese can be blamed for
doing wrong in the planning and execution of Operation Mi. On an abstract
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/9
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level, fault can be found in the rigidity of Japanese carrier doctrine, designed as it
was to deliver massed, integrated, and coordinated blows against a given target.
When the tactical doctrine was given two things to do simultaneously, as it was
at Midway (neutralize the island and the American carrier force), trouble arose.
However, since the doctrine of massed strikes for decisive results is that espoused
as the correct one by carrier enthusiasts then and now, and since the British have
been roundly criticized for not adopting such a doctrine, it is a bit disingenuous
for historians to blame the Japanese for sticking to it.
On a practical level, Yamamoto should very likely have pushed up the Dutch
Harbor raid by a day, to give the Americans more time both to worry about its
implications and to organize a response. Nagumo and his staff should have increased the dawn search by as many as six more Nakajima BSN (Kate) torpedo
bombers acting in a reconnaissance role. All Japanese commanders should have
immediately broken radio silence once it became obvious that the fleet had been
sighted and surprise was no longer a consideration. All these actions would have
been prudent, but none would likely have changed the outcome of the battle,
because the Americans did very many things right. Brilliant code breaking was
combined with an outstanding application of the intelligence thus obtained.
Admirals Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance bravely and correctly launched
their strikes before all the relevant information was in, and at an uncomfortably
long range. Once success had been gained, the Americans acted with admirable
caution. When you add in elements like long-range Catalina flying boats, radar,
and luck, the Americans had more than enough factors working in their favor to
win the battle. No cultural traits or ethno-racial characteristics need be invoked
to explain the outcome.
What are my conclusions? First, military historians collectively, as a profession,
are too often quick to apportion blame. I would posit as a model for avoiding this
habit Eric Grove’s excellent account of the battle of the Philippine Sea, wherein he
praises both Spruance and Admiral Jisabūro Ozawa while stressing—and thereby
hitting the nail on the head—the differences in technology and training as having
been decisive.12 Second, we military historians can be too eager to adopt cultural
explanations, the wholly inadequate expedient of positing “national character,” or
some other vague formulation as an explanatory force. As I like to ask my classes:
Was French national character expressed in 1805–1806 or in 1870–71? Who were
the “real” Frenchmen, the victors on the Marne in 1914 or the losers at Sedan in
1940? Some historians may take comfort in such “explanations,” but this author
does not find them powerful or persuasive.
On a final note, I believe military historians are too often wary of invoking another power—the power of chance and contingency. It is understandable, and in
many ways laudable, to try to determine causality and the factors that contribute
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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to victory and defeat, but we can be fooled into adopting an overly Newtonian
view of battle, as if victory were controlled by iron laws of discrete cause and effect. In short, no matter how disquieting or unsatisfactory it may sound, luck (by
which I mean unplanned or unexpected events that take place in an unintended
manner without or outside human control) can play an explanatory part in assessing the causes of victory and defeat. The smile of the goddess of battle may
be a more powerful metaphor than we would like to believe for the random or
chance factors that influence the course of battle.
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